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What if the reprehensible execution in Indonesia of seven foreigners on 29th April was a 
deliberate form of public diplomacy? The refusal of President Joko Widodo to countenance the 
pleas of foreign leaders and offer clemency has been interpreted in a number of ways, notably as 
that of a contested head of state in a fragile democracy heeding the voice of public opinion 
which, apparently in Indonesia, overwhelmingly supports the death penalty for drug 
trafficking1.  
 
Jokowi is the first Indonesian president not to be drawn from the civil and military elite and 
oligarchies that came to the fore during Suharto’s New Order (1967-1998).  As a former mayor of 
Solo and later governor of Jakarta he epitomizes the new generation of politicians with strong 
local roots who have arisen thanks to the profound decentralisation that is a defining element in 
Indonesia’s democratisation trajectory since Reformasi in 1998. Jokowi was attacked during the 
presidential election campaign by his opponent, Prabowo Subianto, a cashiered former general 
as being merely “a little boy from the kampongs”, not the strong martial leader that Indonesia 
ostensibly needs. Thus, Jokowi’s intransigence has been interpreted as an effort to belie this 
accusation. Moreover, as he lacks a majority in the Indonesian parliament, Jokowi has had to 
govern since his inauguration last October by developing ad hoc coalitions to effectively advance 
his reform agenda. Finally, in his elimination of petrol subsidies during a solemn television 
address, for example, he appealed directly to the good sense of the Indonesian public at large, 
over the selfish interests of pressure groups in society. As one of the cohort of fine scholars of 
Indonesia in Australia, Marcus Mietzner, has cogently argued Jokowi’s populism is of a unique 
variety: reformist, technocratic and one not seeking systemic change. * 
However, is it sufficient to attempt to understand Jokowi’s actions only by reference to the 
domestic Indonesian context? Rather don’t they need to be situated in the wider context of the 
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archipelagic nation-state’s foreign relations? These involve a ‘return to the future’ of the era of 
Indonesia’s founding president Sukarno, from 1949 till 1966. The Sukarno-Jokowi lineage can 
be seen in the underlying philosophy, practice and priorities of Indonesian foreign relations 
today. Certainly the “boy from the kampong” has a very different persona from the bespoke-
tailored, womanising Javanese priyayi (aristocrat) that was Sukarno, yet both their direct 
charismatic appeal to the masses and their political philosophies have common features. While 
Sukarno, unlike Jokowi, enjoyed playing the international statesmen, ultimately for both all 
politics is local with action on the international stage being, above all, a means of advancing 
their domestic agendas. On the contrary, Suharto’s foreign policy with its focus on ASEAN can 
be seen as a tedious confidence-building process, while the two terms of former President 
Yudhoyono (SBY) were spent demonstrating that the “world’s largest Muslim country and third 
largest democracy” was an emerging giant on par with the other BRI(I)Cs. Nevertheless, SBY 
with his moratorium on the use of the death penalty showed that such a demonstration required 
being sensitive to the norms of the West. Jokowi, like Sukarno, would appear to have no such 
qualms. As for ASEAN, it is taken for granted and barely rates a mention in Jokowi’s 
declarations. 
 
As an illustration, Jokowi’s speech on 22nd April 2015 at the sixtieth anniversary celebrations 
for the Asia-Africa (Bandung) conference demonstrated the philosophical lineage with Sukarno 
himself who convened the Conference in 1955. Whilst there was not the same lofty anti-colonial 
rhetoric juxtaposing the New Emerging Forces against the Old Established Forces, the thrust of 
the speech was the same, namely the need to break away from the Western economic order. Is 
this mere rhetoric? Jokowi politically relies on the Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle 
chaired by no other than Sukarno’s daughter, Megawati Sukarnoputri. Two weeks earlier, 
Megawati, whose sense of dynastic entitlement knows no bounds, lectured Jokowi at her party’s 
congress in Bali on 9th April on the need to adhere to its economically nationalist party platform 
and, in private, to advance the career of her daughter, a somewhat underwhelming senior 
minister in his government.  
Many Western observers expected Jokowi, by dint of his background as a businessman running 
a furniture factory dependent on the export trade, to be an economic liberal. This was certainly 
the impression he gave in various international fora - APEC, EAS, G20, Boa Forum - during his 
first seven months in office. Yet instinctively, it would seem, he is an economic nationalist in the 
Sukarnoist tradition. While in the immediate post-independence period economic nationalism 
made both political and economic sense. It was economic orthodoxy for newly independent 
countries like India to embark on an import substitution strategy.  This is no longer the case in a 
globalized world, particularly in Asia, where export-orientation is seen as the key to success. 
Indonesia aspiring to BRIC status has become the only Southeast Asian country to be a member 
of the G20. Moreover, advancing an economically nationalist agendais at least to an extent in 
contradiction with Indonesia’s needs for foreign investment. Given such constraints, it has been 
behoven on Jokowi to affirm his nationalist credentials in other areas, including by resisting 
foreign pressure on the application of the death penalty.  
Turning to the practice, at this juncture, Jokowi like Sukarno (after his eviction of Mohammad 
Hatta and the extended leash given to Subandrio) is essentially his own foreign minister on the 
international stage. There is a clear break with a tradition begun under Suharto with globe-
trotting professional diplomats such as Adam Malik and Ali Alatas articulating a vision of 
Indonesia’s place in the world. After Reformasi, Hassan Wirajudi and Marty Natalegawa 
continued this Kissinger style tradition of highbrow foreign ministers promoting a specifically 
Indonesian Weltanschauung. Compared to her predecessors the present foreign minister, Retno 
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Marsudi so far seems to be an intellectual lightweight. While it would appear that she was 
imposed by Megawati as, symbolically, Indonesia’s first female foreign minister, yet, to be fair, 
the two priorities given to her do not offer an occasion to shine on the international scene. 
 
In these priorities we, once again, have a return to the Sukarno legacy. The first of these is the 
protection of Indonesia’s maritime sovereignty, one infringed upon periodically by the ‘turn the 
boats back’ policy of the present Australian government. This preoccupation is linked to the 
Indonesian sense of homeland tanah-air (the land and the sea) and articulated during the 
Sukarno period in the principle of Wawasan Nusantara. In one of the unheralded successes of 
Indonesian diplomacy this concept was translated into the principle of the Archipelagic State 
enshrined in Part IV of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
completed in 1982 and which came into force in 1994. However, in promoting this agenda it is 
Jokowi’s flamboyant Minister of Maritime and Fishery Affairs, Susi Pudjiastuti, like himself a 
self-made businessperson, who is the most visible exponent. Alas, true to Sukarnoist praxis, like 
the macabre executions of foreign drug traffickers, the protection of Indonesia’s sovereignty has 
been expressed in the most dramatic way conducive to media coverage: the blowing up of illegal 
fishing vessels. On 11th May near the Aceh coast, the Indonesian navy towed a boat containing 
some 400 refugees (probably Rohingyas from Myanmar) back into international waters. This 
was the first use of the method adopted by the Australian government to deal with illegal 
migrants seeking asylum. 
It is worth noting that the other priority given to Retno, namely that of the much-needed 
defence of Indonesian workers overseas has had two weeks ago a collateral happy consequence. 
Partly as a result of a massive social media campaign in Indonesia itself, Mary Jane Veloso, a 
poor clearly manipulated Filipino maid destined for execution with the seven others was granted 
a reprieve. Jokowi’s support base it would appear felt empathy with, in a sense, “one of us” (his 
campaign slogan), and being consistent with his Sukarnoist beliefs, political practice and 
domestic priorities, Indonesia’s president took note. In a domestic expression of this 
consistency, following the execution of two Indonesian maids in Saudi Arabia, the Indonesian 
government announced a permanent ban on sending new domestic workers to twenty-one 
Middle Eastern countries. 
  
This is an extended version of an article posted on12th May on the East Asia Forum housed at 
the Australian National University. 
 
